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I. INTRODUCTION

International law is a vernacular to articulate the behavior of different
legal actors in the international system. Even though the State is an
"important form of political organisation"' and the "principal repository
of legal power, the national state, and its [national] sovereignty, are
becoming increasingly inadequate to meet the needs of our time." 2
Accordingly, the political reality of States and the artificiality of law
manufacture a system of rearranging relationships in which States are no
longer the only entities with political and legal force. States authorize
*

J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2017.

1.

WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 365

(1964).
2.

Id. at 365-66.
167
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non-state actors to engage on this platform through the very rights States
perceive these entities to possess. Legitimacy is thus no longer solely
defined by territorial sovereignty, and actors' degree of legal force
evolves with these changing perceptions. Nonetheless, acceptance of
non-state actors does not diminish States' pursuit of self-interested
opportunities. Due to States' inherent desire to "guard their autonomy and
independence quite jealously," 3 divergent ideologies manifest into actual
conflict. States avail themselves of processes that have adopted the
system's vernacular to maintain the system's order and to provide
recourse.4
Mediation is one process that utilizes international law to engage on
this platform.5 One actor with a rich history of international mediation is
the Holy See. Scholars Jeffery Bercovitch and S. Ayse KadayifciOrellana explain that faith-based actors' spiritual and moral leverage
legitimize their intervention in international conflicts. 6 The religious
values that faith-based actors evoke in followers allow them to better
influence opinions and to thus encourage a peaceful resolution.' Under
this theory, the Holy See's unique leverage, as the embodiment of
Catholic spiritual force, justifies its intervention between warring
Catholic nations. Even in the absence of territorial sovereignty, the Holy
See has engaged in alternative dispute resolution on multiple occasions.
The Holy See served as an arbiter for a conflict between Germany and
Spain in 1885, an arbiter for the border dispute between Haiti and Santo
Domingo in 1895, and a mediator in the Beagle Channel dispute between

3. Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Langley, The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness
of InternationalMediation, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 670, 670 (1993).
4. See generally Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About InternationalLaw: Prologue

to a Configurative Jurisprudence, Faculty Scholarship Series (1968)

(explaining how

international law is but one process situated in a larger framework of interpreting global
processes).
5. See Jacob Bercovitch, Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and
Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations, 40 INT'L J. .736, 743 (1985).
Bercovitch presents the different roles for third-party intervention: fact-finder, chairmen (prevent
breakdown of communication), enunciator (interpret the information), conciliator (try to bring
both sides together), mediator (offer proposals), and leader (exert pressure so disputants accept
the intermediary's recommendation).

6.

Jacob Bercovitch & S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, Religion and Mediation: The Role of

Faith-BasedActors in InternationalConflict Resolution, 14 INT'L NEGOT. 175, 187 (2009) (citing

Kadayifci-Orellana).
7. See id. at 187 (citing Kadayifci-Orellana 2008). Bercovtich and Kadayifci-Orellana do
qualify their argument by stating that the spiritual and religious motivations behind intervening is
only one of the distinct characteristics of faith-based mediation. See id. at 185. However, the
article only briefly states these other characteristics and does not adequately distinguish between
the different religious actors' sources of credibility. Assessing legitimacy at the international level
complicates the authors' analysis.
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Argentina and Chile from 1797-1984.8
However, requests for papal mediation are not only made on behalf of
Catholic nations. Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana claim that religious
leaders' prominence and respect in conflict-infused regions, such as the
Middle East, grant religious leaders the leverage to intervene and reframe the situations in order to pacify hostilities in the surrounding
communities. 9 This theory is problematically grounded in the assumption
that religious leaders' influence is limited only to those individuals who
follow the same faith. The literature presents a uniform comparison of all
faith-based actors; yet, these actors have varying degrees of influence
within the religious communities they serve and the international
community as a whole. The Holy See's growing presence in the Middle
East and its role in the abatement of tensions in the region through
mediation complicate the notion that the Holy See's legitimacy to serve
as an intermediary in international conflicts solely derives from its
spiritual force.
This Article will use the Holy See as a subject to argue that spiritual
force is a simplistic analysis of faith-based actors' credibility to mediate
international conflicts. This Article will evaluate appeals for papal
mediation by non-Catholic parties to elucidate the Holy See's different
platforms of legitimacy. Due to the high levels of secrecy within
international mediation, there are limitations in the amount of available
information detailing the resolutions. Accordingly, the platforms
presented may not be apparent in every case evaluated. However, the lack
of available information on the details of the mediation does not mean
that the other platforms were not influential factors behind the parties'
appeal to the Holy See's intervention.
The Article will define mediation broadly in order to capture the Holy
See's involvement in all conflict management, including indirect
mediation. Accordingly, this Article will adopt Jacob Bercovitch,
Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette Wille's behavioral approach to
international mediation, which is described as follows: "[A] process of
conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept
an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle
their conflict or resolve their difference without resorting to physical
force or invoking the authority of the law.""o
This Article will begin with an introduction of the literature on
international mediation to provide an overview of the characteristics
8. Jaclyn O'Brien McEachem, Diplomatic Activity in Service of Papal Teaching: The
Promotion of Religious Freedom in Relations with Selected Islamic States During the Pontificate

of John Paul II, at 105, 178 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University of
America).
9.
10.

Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, supra note 6, at 187.
Bercovitch & Langley, supra note 3, at 671.
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unique to international disputes and to illustrate the attributes of the
parties that make international mediation a distinct paradigm of dispute
resolution. The second Part will then complicate the international
mediation literature by introducing the international relations theory with
respect to conflict resolution. The theory provides a predictive framework
of different mediation approaches and sources of legitimacy for non-state
actors. The second Part will also apply the theory with respect to the Holy
See to illustrate its international legal personality and States'
receptiveness of this attribute. The final Part will apply both the
mediation literature and the international relations theory to various
conflicts the Holy See mediated in order to distinguish the Holy See's
sources of legitimacy when mediating conflicts strictly between Catholic
nations from conflicts involving non-Catholic nations and/or entities.
II. MEDIATION AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A. An Overview ofInternationalMediation Literature
According to Wolfgang Friedmann, "[c]onflicts of power, conflicts of
national interest, and conflicts of ideology, are all real and important
forces in international relations."" Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille
introduce five types of conflicts that could arise in the international
system: (1) sovereignty issues involving incompatible claims to territory;
(2) ideology issues focusing on the nature of a political system; (3)
security issues concerning frontiers, borders, and territories; (4) issues of
self-determination and national selfhood; and (5) a residual category of
other types of conflict. 12 Mediation should be a more favorable outcome
in which the process guarantees implementation of the actual
settlement.1 3 The process is only more favorable when direct negotiations
reach a stalemate. Thus, an intermediary is instrumental in facilitating
dialogue to further internationally upheld normative judgments and to
reduce the overall risks in making concessions. 14
Accordingly, the characteristics of the mediator are critical to the
acceptance of mediation as an alternative process. First, parties will
assess the mediator's motivations and the potential impact these
motivations will have on the mediation's success.15 An actor can
11. FRIEDMANN, supra note 1, at 366.
12. Marieke Kleiboer, UnderstandingSuccess andFailureofInternationalMediation, 2 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 360, 364 (1996).
13. Saadia Touval & I William Zartman, InternationalMediation in the Post-Cold War
Era, in CHESTER A. CROCKER ET AL., TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 432 (2001).

14.
15.

See id.
See Bercovitch, supra note 5, at 749.
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intervene under different pretenses, including: a constitutional mandate
requiring intervention, fear that the dispute could cause violence, desire
to maintain the system's current structure, or the disputants' appeal to
third-party intervention. 16 Adversaries' decision to approach a particular
mediator predicates on the mediator's leverage over both parties to
engage in the process and to accept a proposed settlement. Leverage is a
type of influence that can manifest through physical, financial, or
informational pressures.1 7 Leverage can "modify positions, get either side
to make concessions, and generally engineer a movement toward a
settlement" through rewards and sanctions. 18 Political scientist Saadia
Touval and Professor I. Williams Zartman present the six sources of
leverage, but stress that leverage itself is difficult to achieve.' 9 Touval
and Zartman maintain that leverage is not a manifestation of concrete
attributes. 20 Rather, it is a reflection of the parties' perceptions of the
mediator. 2 1 Leverage consists of the mediator's ability to do the
following: persuade, present alternatives, extract feasible positions from
each party, withdraw from the mediation, restrict certain positions,
withhold resources, and add resources. 22
Furthermore, both States and non-state actors serve as intermediaries,
but their different motivations to intervene shape their mediation tactics.
Non-state mediators' legitimacy is not indisputable like States' inherent
legitimacy, which is rooted in sovereignty and national security interests.
Consequently, non-state mediators must establish their reputations as
interested parties with the skills to serve as intermediaries.23 Therefore,
they are more inclined to proposition themselves as facilitators of peace,
which is "inherent[ly] desirab[le]."2 4
B. InternationalRelations Theory on Conflict Resolution
International relations theory presents two types of intermediaries:
hard realists and soft realists. Hard realists seek a "narrow range of
intervention strategies," which mostly contemplate the use of force.2 5 In

16.
17.
18.

Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 749-50

19.

Touval & Zartman, supra note 13, at 437.

20.

Id

21.
22.

Id.
Id.; see also Fen Osler Hampson, Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner, in
CROCKER ET AL., supra note 13, at 390 ("mediation leverage depends upon persuasion, extraction,
termination, manipulation, and the ability to offer side payments and/or withhold resources.").
23. Touval & Zartman, supra note 13, at 431.

24.

Id. at 431-32.

25.

Hampson, supra note 22, at 388.
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26
contrast, soft realists evaluate a wider scope of policy considerations.
For instance, soft realists may pursue diplomacy and mediation as
potential intervention strategies to address conflicts grounded in a
security dilemma.2 7 The mediator must insert the "right mix of
inducements," a mixture of both positive and negative incentives, in order
28
to reduce the proclivity to defect and spoil the process. Additionally,
the attentiveness of the mediator is critical: the success of the process
hinges on the conflict reaching a "plateau or level of a 'hurting
29
stalemate"' that makes confrontation more costly than settlement.
Accordingly, the mediator must be able to recognize when the disputants
are confronting this plateau.
Non-state actors' intervention strategies are more aligned with soft
realists. Non-state actors are entities with the political and social
influence to participate in the international system. States award
international personality to entities that do not fall within the codified
structure of statehood, which is defined by the Montevideo Convention
on Rights and Duties of States. 3 0 International personality grants these
entities "the capacity to be a bearer of rights and duties under
international law," 3 1 and the entity becomes a "subject of international
33
law." 32 However, international personality is a legal construct. The
State's rights and duties need not be reflective of the State's attributes;
they are "faculties and obligations defined by the law governing the
relations between the creating States." 34 Furthermore, personality is not
a binding attribute on all States. 35 For instance, Article 3 of the
Montevideo Convention declares that the "political existence of the
36
[S]tate is independent of recognition by the other [S]tates".
Contrastingly, personality manifests from each State's perception of the
37
entity's position in the international system.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 391.
29. Id.
30. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (defining "[t]he state as a
person of international law . . . that possess[es] . . . (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.").
31. Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Holy See and the Concept ofInternationalLegal Personality:
Some Reflections, 19 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 1, 7 (1986).

32.

Id.

33.

See P.E. Corbett, What is the League of Nations?, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 119, 142-43

(1923).
34.

Id. at 143 (emphasis added).

35. Robert J. Araujo, The Holy See-InternationalPerson and Sovereign, 1 AVE MARIA
INT'L L.J. 1, 30 (2011).
36. Montevideo Convention, supra note 30, art. 3.

37.

Id.
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The theory behind international personality is essential to
understanding the Holy See. The Holy See is a "permanentsubject of
general customary international law vis-a-vis all states." 3 8 The term
should not be confused with the Vatican or Vatican City. 3 9 The Code of
Canon Law states, "[The] term Holy See refers not only to the Roman
Pontiff but also the Secretariat of State, the Council for Public Affairs of
the Church, and other institutes of the Roman Curia." 4 0 Scholars propose
objective international personality tests to determine whether a non-state
entity is a subject of international law. 4 1 One commonly applied standard
is Professor D.P. O'Connell's three-part personality test, which inquires:
(1) the rules of international law and its accordance with the entity's legal
claims; (2) the legal relations the entity may enter into; and (3) other
factors that affirm the legal capacities the entity claims to have. 42 If the
subject satisfies the test, ipso facto it has legal personality.4 3 Applying
this test to the Holy See confirms its international status and elucidates
some of the sources of its legitimacy to engage on this international
platform. 44

The Holy See satisfies O'Connell's objective personality test in the
following ways. First, international law establishes the Holy See's unique
sovereign status as a temporal power. The 1929 Lateran Treaty between
the Holy See and Italy functions under the presumption of its
international personality.4 5 Article 2 of the treaty describes Italy's
recognition of the Holy See's sovereignty in the international system, "as
an attribute inherent in its nature, in conformity with its tradition and with
the requirements of its mission in the world." 4 6 Additionally, Article 12
affirms the Holy See's "active and passive right of legation under the
norms of general international law." 4 7 The right of legation is an
important attribute to assess given that it is the "necessary corollary of
38.

Josef L. Kunz, The Status ofthe Holy See in InternationalLaw, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 308,

309 (1952).
39. McEachern, supra note 8, at 96.
40. Id. (English translation of Codex luris Canonici auctoritate Jaonnis Pauli PP. II
promulgates(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticaana, 1983)).
41. See Maluwa, supra note 31, at 8.

42.
43.

Id.
Id

44. It is important to note that other tests do exist. Due to limited space, this Article will
not apply these other examples. However, another test to also consider is Lassa Francis Lawrence
Oppenheim's five-part international personality test. The test examines the subject's (1) right to
legation, (2) right of sovereignty, (3) right of intervention, (4) capacity to hold a protectorate, and
(5) right to declare war and peace. See Corbett, supra note 33, at 121 (applying Oppenheim's test

to prove the legal personality of the League of Nations).
45. See Matthew N. Bathon, The Atypical InternationalStatus of the Holy See, 34 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L 597, 603-04 (2001) (defining the current status of Holy See).

46.

Id at 603.

47.

Kunz, supra note 38, at 312.
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the 'fundamental right' of a State." 48 The Holy See has exercised this
right since the end of the 16th century when it first began to send
permanent representatives to the courts of Catholic temporal powers. 49 In
fact, the Holy See currently has diplomatic missions in 172 States.50
Second, the Holy See can conclude international treaties on behalf of
itself and Vatican City.5 1 For example, the 1959 Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties states that the Holy See was "regarded as possessing
international treaty-making capacity."52 Additionally, the International
Law Commission also expressly acknowledges its ability to "enter into
treaties on the same basis of states." 53 Furthermore, the 1983 Code of
Canon Law upholds treaties signed by the Holy See under pacta sunt
servanda ("agreements must be kept"). Thus, the Church's law may not
"abrogate or derogate from the pacts [concordats, treaties, other
international agreements, etc.] entered upon by the Apostolic See 54 with
nations or other political societies."5
Third, the Holy See's activities in the international system solidify its
legal personality. In 1964, the Holy See became a Permanent Observer in
the United Nations. 56 This status permitted its attendance and
participation in U.N. conferences with Member States. Accordingly, the
United Nations invites artificial legal personality into its sphere of
influence. Permanent Observers can access most meetings and any
documentation about these conferences.5 7 Even though the Holy See's
non-member state status diminishes its influence in the General
Assembly and in other committees, Bathon explains that it still "yields
actual power in world affairs."' 8 Permanent Observers can discuss a
variety of international issues with the different sovereign powers. They
engage in the very discussions that potentially influence General
Assembly voting patterns and the individual Member States' preferences.
Applying O'Connell's test to the Holy See is necessary to understand
this international subject outside of the Catholic Church. The Holy See's
48. Corbett, supra note 33, at 123.
49. Robert J. Araujo, The InternationalPersonality and Sovereignty of the Holy See, 50
CATH. U. L. REV. 291, 300 (2001).

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 332.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 343.
The Apostolic See is another term used for the Holy See. See Kurt Martens, The

Position of the Holy See and Vatican City State in InternationalRelations, 83 U. DET. MERCY L.

REV. 729, 730 (2006).
55. Araujo, supra note 49, at 342.
56. Bathon, supra note 45, at 605.
57. About PermanentObservers, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sections/memberstates/about-permanent-observers/index.html.
58. Bathon, supra note 45, at 608.
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engagement with sovereign States-through the exchange of legationsits signatory status on international agreements, and its position in
international organizations expand its legal personality beyond the
confines of the Catholic World. Hence, Bercovitch and KadayifciOrellana's spiritual force argument is a simplistic answer that fails to
fully consider certain faith-based actors' transnational influences in a
system no longer functioning under the body of canon law.
III. PAPAL MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A. Overview ofPapalMediation
State solicitation for papal mediation is another indication of the Holy
See's international legal personality. In Article 23 of the Lateran Treaty,
the Holy See proclaimed that it would not meddle in the affairs of
disputing nations, unless the disputants themselves appealed to the Holy
See with full knowledge of its platform to promote peace and morality.5 9
In 1915, the Holy See instructed all Catholic nations to settle international
disputes "according to law and justice." 60 Accordingly, the Holy See
presented itself as a potential intermediary that upholds the law in
settlements; hence, it is not solely bounded by canon law. Additionally,
diplomats have publicly acknowledged the Holy See's influence outside
of the Catholic Church, which strengthens the institution's own
diplomatic credibility. For instance, Francis Campbell, a former British
ambassador to the Holy See, acknowledged that the Holy See was "one
of the world's greatest opinion formers." 6 1 People listened to these
opinions, irrespective of their personal stances.62
Jaclyn O'Brien McEachern, scholar in Canon Law, explains that the
papacy's diplomacy became rooted in both theological and juridical
principles, with the latter drawn from "the general principles of politics
and natural, canon and international law." 63 Naturally, the Holy See's
personality strengthened over time, as it continued to engage in
alternative dispute resolution and applied international law in these
settlements. For instance, in the 1885 Caroline Islands dispute between

59. Cedric Ryngaert The Legal Status ofthe Holy See, 3 GOETTNGEN J. INT'L L. 829, 849
n.84 (2011).
60. Id. at 850 (quoting an editorial comment in the American Journal of International
Law).
61. Jim Yardley, Under Francis, a Bolder Vision of Vatican Diplomacy Emerges, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes. com/2014/12/19/world/europe/pope-francis-vaticandiplomatic-mediator-cuba.html?_r--0.
62. Id.
63. McEachern, supra note 8, at 100.
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64
Germany and Spain, Pope Leo XII served as an arbiter. He used
international law's understanding of inchoate titles to claim that Spain
65
had an inchoate title because it discovered the islands and that Spain's
displayed activities in support of the island's people turned the inchoate
title into a legal entitlement of possession. 66 Subsequently, during the
First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, Czar Nicholas II considered the
Holy See a potential invitee to the discussions, given its "traditional role
as a mediator among nations." 67 Additionally, the Holy See mediated the
68
1992 border dispute between Ecuador and Peru.
Papal mediation between disputants that practice Catholicism is not a
surprise. The Holy See's spiritual and moral stature demonstrates its
credibility to intervene. 6 9 However, the Holy See's leverage extends
beyond the mere sense of morality and spirituality that it inculcates in
followers. The Holy See is a well-staffed institution with extensive
resources and time to dedicate to mediations, which normal state actors
are unable utilize to the same degree. For example, in the Beagle Channel
Dispute, the Holy See conducted over 400 meetings in the Vatican with
the disputing nations, 7 0 and all meetings were kept separate and private
to manage the parties' interactions. 7 1 Members of the clergy, who are
trained listeners and empathizers, facilitate such meetings and
negotiations.7 2 Furthermore, the Vatican's principle of secrecy and nondisclosure 7 3 lends the Holy See bureaucratic privilege to mediate

64.

THOMAS PRINCEN,

INTERMEDIARIES IN

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 227 n.5 (2014).

65. Id.; see Islands of Palmas (United States v. Neth.), 2 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1928) (stating that title of discovery exists only as an inchoate title and the right to display
activities of a State created the corollary duty to protect the people within the jurisdiction).
66. Dr. Friedrich August Freiherr Von Der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and
Virtual Effectiveness in InternationalLaw, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 448, 466 (1935).
67. David Alvarez, The Holy See and the First Hague Peace Conference, 26 ARCHIVUM
HISTORIAE PONTIFICIAE 431. 433 (1988).
68. Peru's PresidentBacks Vatican Mediation in Border Dispute with Ecuador, AGENCE

FRANCE-PRESSE (Jan. 11, 1992), Factiva, Doc. No. afpr00020011106dol bOOc4O.
69. See Renato Cardinal Martino, The Church and InternationalOrder, 2 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 49, 52 (2004) ("his presence manifests the hope that they have met a kindred spirit who also

seeks the perfection of solidarity among all people of goodwill."); see also Jodok Troy, The
Catholic Church: An Underestimated and Necessary Actor in InternationalAffairs, 9 GEO. J.
enters diplomatic dealings as the 'supreme pastor of the
INT'L AFF. 65, 66 (2008) ("the Pope ...
Church,'. . . In that role, he has respectable capabilities, culminating in the recognition of Vatican

foreign policy as Papal foreign policy.").
70.

Lisa Lindsley, The Beagle ChannelSettlement: Vatican MediationResolves a Century-

Old Dispute, 29 J. CHURCH & STATE 435, 448 (1987).
71. Thomas Princen, InternationalMediation-The View from the Vatican: Lessons from
Mediating the Beagle Channel Dispute, 3 NEGOT. J. 347, 351 (1987).
72. Id. at 349; see also M.C. Mirow, InternationalLaw and Religion in Latin America: The
Beagle ChannelDispute, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1, 22 (2004-2005).

73.

Princen, supra note 71, at 351-52 (secrecy is the norm and upholding confidentiality is

a "standard operating procedure"); see also Mirow, supra note 72 at 22.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss2/1

10

McFarlane: The Holy See's Diplomacy: An Analysis of Papal Mediation in the M

THE HOLY SEE'S DIPLOMACY

2016]

177

negotiations between parties that already deem the Holy See a superior
force with persuasive value.
B. PapalMediation Between Non-Catholic Disputants
Even though the first instances of papal mediation dealt with Catholic
parties, the Holy See's current ability to mediate is no longer limited to
conflicts between Catholic disputants. The Holy See has increasingly
served as an intermediary between Non-Catholic entities and even
received invitations from Muslim leaders. The influence of papal
mediation no longer predicates on the spiritual commonalities between
all of the parties. Rather, the Holy See exercises "soft power" through
cultural diplomacy.7 4 In 1984, Agostino Cardinal Casaroli elaborated on
the Holy See's unique role in international affairs. He explained that the
Holy See is distinguishable from State actors with political and territorial
interests to protect, and that the Holy See is in "a position to see with
greater objectivity .... and must also endeavor to maintain complete
independence."` 5 The following case studies demonstrate that papal
mediation is the corollary to the Holy See's diplomatic relations. The
Holy See strategically deepened its cultural diplomacy with nations to
legitimize its international presence outside of the Catholic Church's
realm.
1. The Normalization of U.S.-Cuba Diplomatic Relations
The role of papal mediation in normalizing U.S.-Cuba relations
provides insight into the Holy See's political legitimacy to mediate
conflicts in the Middle East. Even though Cuba is a Catholic nation and
the majority of the U.S. population identifies as Christian,7 6 both
countries' historically fractured relationships with the Vatican call into
question the presumption that spiritual force is the Holy See's main
74.
Cultural Diplomacy may best be described as a course of actions, which are
based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects
of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural
cooperation, promote national interests and beyond; Cultural diplomacy can be
practiced by either the public sector, private sector or civil society.
What is Diplomacy?, INST. FOR CULTURAL DIPL. (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.culturaldiplomacy.
org/index.php?en culturaldiplomacy.
75. Princen, supra note 71, at 349 (citing PETER HEBBLETHWAITE, IN THE VATICAN 70

(Adler & Adler ed., 1986)).
76. Frank Newport, In U.S., 77% Identify as Christian, GALLUP (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 59548/identify-christian.aspx.
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vehicle of leverage over disputing nations. The Holy See had to first
reestablish its relationship with both governments before interposing
itself as an intermediary that could mediate a process of reconciliation
between the two nations. The strategies the Holy See employed
illuminate the similar approaches it took to earn the respect and political
tolerance of the Middle East.
The relationship between the United States and the Vatican fluctuated
with the economic and political needs of the United States. When the
United States first gained its independence, it quickly established
relations with the Vatican to secure political legitimacy in the
international system. 7 However, this relationship quickly deteriorated at
the end of the American Civil War. 7 8 During the sectional conflict, the
Confederate South appealed to the Holy See to obtain its diplomatic
recognition. 79 This need for credibility, however, ceased when the South
surrendered.80 The United States subsequently severed diplomatic
relations with the Holy See and only fully reestablished them in 1984,
when the United States realized that the Holy See was a critical player in
81
fermenting social change in various parts of the world. However, it is
important to not underemphasize the Holy See's strategies to resume
relations. During this time, the Holy See's foreign policy platform shifted
to the promotion of human rights and to the extinguishment of
communism.82 Pope John Paul II recognized that aligning the institution
with the United States was opportune due to the Reagan administration's
similar disdain of communism.8 3
The Holy See's relationship with Cuba similarly fluctuated with the
foreign policy interests of both entities. After the Cuban Revolution, Fidel
Castro's harsh policies toward clergymen created a fissure between the
84
Catholic nation and its people's ruling bishop. Nonetheless, the Holy
See maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba, regardless of the
persecution of clergymen in the country and the communist system in
place.85 Consequently, the Holy See sustained relations with both the
United States and Cuba during the entire 50-year diplomatic stalemate.
Pope John XXIII's effort to mediate the Cuban Missile Crisis in 196286
77.

Jo Renee Formicola, US. -Vatican Relations: Toward a Post-Cold War Convergence,

38 J. CHURCH & ST. 799, 800 (1996).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.

See id. at 809.

82.
83.

Id. at 808.
Id.

84. Isa Mendes, Mending Bridges: The Unfinished Business of the U.S. and Cuba, BPC
PoL'Y BRIEF 5, Apr.-May 2015, at 4, 11.

85.
86.

Id.
Id.
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was the Holy See's first attempt to mediate relations. The mediation was
"unofficial and solitary," 87 but the Pope's public appeal for both countries
to peacefully resolve the issue88 potentially facilitated the conflict's
resolution. The Holy See's involvement in the resolution of U.S.-Cuba
disputes did not end with this one instance of success. The Holy See also
brokered a deal between both countries that led to the release of more
than fifty political prisoners and foreigners in Cuba by the beginning of
2015.89
The Holy See's foreign policy decisions have not always benefited the
United States. Fidel Castro's visit to the Vatican in 1996 and Pope John
Paul II's visit to Cuba in 1998 only strengthened the Holy See's political
presence in the country. 9 0 During the Pope's visit, he proclaimed the
Cuban people's right to "freedom . . . grounded on the values of spirit
before the values of politics." 9 1 The Holy See's proclamation led to
Castro's decision to reduce restrictions on the Catholic Church in Cuba
and to release nearly 200 prisoners.9 2 Nonetheless, this invocation of
spirituality does not mean that the Holy See's legitimacy derives from
values of spirit rather than from politics. In 2010, during Pope Benedict
XVI's visit to Cuba, the Pope and other U.S. bishops criticized the U.S.
embargo on the basis of human rights violations.93 Application of human
rights principles, which form the language of legitimacy in the
international system, 94 is a political tool that the Holy See has
successfully utilized and continues to deploy in its international affairs,
including mediation.
The Holy See's multiple engagements with both countries legitimized
its role in the renewal of U.S.-Cuba diplomatic relations in 2014.
President Barack Obama urged the Holy See to directly intervene in the
ongoing negotiations in Canada. 9 5 In 2015, the Holy See confirmed that
its offices would "facilitate a constructive dialogue on delicate matters,
87.

Id.

88. Ernest Evans, The Vatican and the Islamic Word, 169 WORLD AFF. 171, 171 (2007).
89. Brianna Lee, US-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/pl 1113.
90. Mendes, supra note 84, at 11, 12.

91.
92.

Id. at 12.
Id.

93. See Haaland Matlary, The Just Peace: The Public and ClassicalDiplomacyofthe Holy
See, 14 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 80, 91 (2007); see also How the Pope Playeda CrucialRole
in US-Cuba Deal, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/cen

tralamericaandthecaribbean/cuba/1 1873213/How-the-Pope-played-a-crucial-role-in-US-Cuba-d
eal.html.
94. For instance, David Kennedy explains "political leaders now routinely justify warfare
in the language of human rights and international law." David Kennedy, Lawfare and Warfare,
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INT'L L. 158, 179 (2012).
95. Mendes, supra note 84, at 12.
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resulting in solutions acceptable to both parties." 96 Pope Francis' success
in thawing the diplomatic stalemate was not independent of his
predecessors' "quiet Vatican diplomacy." 97 Pope John Paul II was the
first Pope to visit Cuba in 1998, and his successor, Pope Benedict XVI,
visited the country in 2012.98 During his visit, Pope Benedict XVI
expressed the Vatican's disapproval of the embargo and its desire for the
United States and Cuba to reconcile. 99 Accordingly, the former Director
of the Holy See Press Office, Joaquin Navarro-Valls, emphasized the
impact of the Holy See's overt persistence in its "quiet diplomacy": "A
Pope who came from Eastern Europe had opened up the way. Another
Pope, this time from South America, would complete it. And another wall
has fallen." 100
The actual mediation progressed in four stages. First, the nations'
Secretaries of State spoke four different times about reestablishing
relations. 10 ' Second, the Pope sent a letter to both nations' Presidents
102
recommending that the countries "initiate a new phase in relations"
03 Third, the
and resolve "humanitarian questions of common interest."'
meetings moved to Vatican City in October of 2014,104 likely to allow
more of the Holy See's clergymen to facilitate negotiations. Finally, on
December 15, 2014, the two nations reached an agreement after a forty05
five minute phone call between President Obama and President Castro.
This agreement included the release of prisoners on both sides for
06
humanitarian reasons, and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.'
Miguel Diaz, the U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican between 2009 and
2010, credits the successful mediation to the "astute and experienced
diplomats" working for the Holy See. 107 For instance, Giovanni Angelo
Becciu, one of the top officials of the Vatican's Secretariat of State, 108
96.

How the Pope Played a CrucialRole in US-Cuba Deal, supra note 93.

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

101.

Mendes, supranote 84, at 12.

102. Id.
103.

Philip Pullella, Pope'sLatin American Brains Trust was Behind Cuba Deal, REUTERS

(Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pope-cuba-mediation-idUSKBNOJX1VG20
141219.
104. Mendes, supra note 84, at 13.
105. Id.; see also William M. LeoGrande & Jenny Morin Nenoff, When Pigs Fly: Charting
a New Course for US.-Cuban Relations, ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG (Feb. 2015),
http://www.rosalux-nyc.org/when-pigs-fly/.
106. Pullella, supra note 103.
107. Michelle Boorstein, Pope FrancisTakes a PublicRole in U.S. -Cuba Relations, WASH.
POST (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pope-francis-takes-a-public-role-

in-us-cuba-relations/2014/12/17/9a394168-862f-I1e4-a702-fa3Iff4ae98e
108.

story.html.

See John L. Allen Jr., Francis Reboots Vatican System with New Secretary of State,
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and Cardinal Pietro Parolin, Pope Francis' Secretary of State,1 09 were two
Latin American experts who could engage with the Cuban opposition." 0
However, the Holy See's credibility to mediate these negotiations
stemmed from its history of diplomacy with both countries. Cuba trusted
the Holy See because of its opposition to the embargo."' The United
States, on the other hand, acknowledged the Vatican's success in similar
mediations, as well as its own prolonged and steady diplomatic relations
with the Holy See.11 2 Accordingly, an actor's legitimacy to serve as a
mediator in international conflict is rooted in the multiplicity of
engagements between the intermediary and the disputants. This case does
not preclude the Holy See's spirituality as an influential factor of its
appeal in general. However, it illustrates that spiritual values may not
always be legitimating factors behind every instance of papal mediation.
2. Papal Mediation in the Middle East
The papacy's involvement in the reestablishment of U.S.-Cuba
relations reminded the international community that the Holy See is an
effective peacemaker. Israeli tourist Josef Amir, for instance, stated that
he believes the institution can also make a difference in the Middle East
and can "give the people the hope that everyone is equal all over the
world."ll 3 Amir's suggestion for papal involvement in the Middle East is
not an obtuse idea. The Pope's presence in Muslim communities has
expanded with the deepening of diplomatic relations between the Vatican
and the different Muslim nations. As the Holy See's respect and trust
solidify in the region, the international community is witnessing a shift in
papal persuasion in which Muslim entities, both States and organizations,
are increasingly appealing to papal mediation.
The Holy See's cultural diplomacy in the Middle East has matured
with time. In 1981, King Hassan II of Morocco personally invited Pope

NAT'L CATHOLIC REPORTER (Aug. 31, 2013), http://ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/francisreboots-vatican-system-new-secretary-state. Giovanni Angelo Becciu was the Holy See's
previous ambassador to Cuba. Pullela, supranote 103. In 2011, Pope Benedict XV1 appointed the
archbishop as the Substitute for General Affairs. Pope Francisappoints new Secretary of State,
CATHOLICCULTURE.ORG (Aug. 31, 2013), https://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.

cfm?storyid=18893. The Substitute is the top official for internal church affairs.
109. See Pullella, supra note 103. Cardinal Pietro Parolin served as the Vatican's
ambassador in Venezuela where he worked to establish relations between the Holy See and Hugo

Chavez, an important ally of Fidel Castro. Id.
110. See Id.
I 11. Vatican Mediation in US-Cuba Relations Applauded, VOA (Dec. 18, 2014), http://
www.voanews.com/a/reu-vatican-mediation-in-us-cuba-relations-applauded/2564401.html
112. Id.

113.

Id.
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John Paul II to visit the Islamic nation. 1 14 Before accepting, the Pope
asked the King what influence a Catholic Pope could have on an Islamic
population. "5 King Hassan II explained that the Pope does not just have
as well." 116
a religious responsibility "but an educational and moral one
He encouraged the Pope to speak to the Moroccan youth "about moral
standards and relationships affecting individuals, communities, nations,
and religions."1 1 7 Pope John Paul II was responsive to the King's
understanding of his various responsibilities." 8 The Pope subsequently
delivered a speech to 80,000 Muslim youth, making him the first pope to
ever address a Muslim audience by invitation from a Muslim leader.119
This exchange revealed that solidarity between the two groups was
possible.
One impetus behind the Holy See's diplomacy in the Middle East
concerns the Christian minorities living in the region. However, the Holy
See's involvement was not solely rooted in religion. Professor George
Emile Irani explains that the Holy See's involvement can be described at
two interrelated levels: a humanitarian-religious level and a diplomatic
level.1 20 In 1983, William F. Murphy, the under-secretary to the Pontifical
Commission on Justice and Peace of the Holy See, explained that the
Holy See intended "to offer its services and good offices, such as
arbitration and mediation, in any and every way that is consistent with its
spiritual mission ... [and] find[s] the way to a just and lasting peace that
2
will guarantee the legitimate rights of all involved."' 1 The invocation of
its spiritual mission is not to constrain the Holy See's legitimacy to
spirituality, but rather to present its platform as one that is aligned with
protecting the welfare of the Christian people. Hence, the Holy See
simply cannot entertain discussions that attempt to undermine Christian
22
communities because it is not an impartial actor in international affairs.1
Nonetheless, certain Muslim leaders still view the Holy See as a credible
international actor capable of mediating conflicts in the region. The
following cases illustrate the various instances in which Muslim actors
appealed to papal mediation and the reasons behind these invitations.

114.

ROMANO
115.
116.
117.
118.

McEachern, supra note 8, at 275 (citing HistoricMeeting in Morocco, L'OSSERVATORE

(English ed. (Vatican City) Sept. 9, 1985)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

119. McEachem, supra note 8, at 276.
120. George Emile Irani, The Holy See and the Israeli-PalestinianConflict, in THE
VATICAN, ISLAM, AND THE MIDDLE EAST 125 (Kail C. Ellis ed., 1987).

121. Id. at 126.
122. See id.
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3. Papal Mediation in Syria
The Holy See's endeavor to mediate the Syrian crisis, with the support
of Muslim religious authority Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,1 2 3 provides insight into the Holy See's
credibility in the region. George Sabra, member of the executive
committee of the Syrian National Council, states that the council "hope[s]
that [the Pope] makes another step toward solidarity with the Syrian
people, all the while ensuring a peaceful and democratic transition of
power in which Christians will have a role."l 2 4 Additionally, Syrian
Defense Minister Mustafa Talas also supported papal mediation because,
as he explained "John Paul II is a great religious leader who firmly
believes in peace and justice."l 25 The Vatican also commented on the
Holy See's presence in the Syrian Civil War. Italian Cardinal Bertone
explained that the clergy must intervene in order to address a conflict
"that won't end politically." 2 6 The Cardinal encouraged settling the
dispute with an agreement rooted in humanitarian law, which outlines
States' responsibilities and respects the rights of all people.1 2 7
Invitations for papal intervention on behalf of Muslim parties reveal
the Holy See's unique leverage. The United Nations attempted to
facilitate negotiations by sending Kofi Annan as a special envoy that
would mediate a peace agreement.1 2 8 This failed mission to "forge a
peace" 29 sheds light on the importance of leverage in mediation. Annan
described the crisis as a conflict in which "[t]he distribution of force and
the divisions in Syrian society are such that only a serious negotiated
political transition can hope to end the repressive rule." 3 0 However,
Annan lacked the leverage necessary to influence reconciliation because
the parties did not see "any value beyond enhancing their diplomatic
position."' 3 ' The Syrian conflict is an ongoing civil war. However,
appeals to Papal intervention elucidate the Holy See's unique diplomatic
123. Pope Joins Ayatollahs in Syria Mediation Effort, ALMONITOR (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/pope-benedict-ayatollah-sistani-to-mediate-s
yria-crisis.html [hereinafter Pope JoinsAyatollahs].
124. Id
125. Syrian Defense Minister Says Syria Would Consider Indirect Papal Mediation, BBC
MONITORING MIDDLE EAST-POLITICAL (May 11, 2001), Factiva, Doc. No. bbcmep0020010710

dx5bOOOt7.
126.

Pope Joins Ayatollahs, supra note 123.

127.

Id.

128.

Tony Karon, Why Syria andthe World will Miss Kofi Annan's PeacePlan, TIME (Aug.

02, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/08/02/why-syria-and-the-world-will-miss-kofi-annanspeace-plan/.
129. Id
130. Id.
13 1.

Id.
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leverage in the Middle East, especially in a country where Christians
make up only 10% of the population. 1 3 2
4. Papal Mediation in the U.S.-Iraq War
On the day Iraq declared a unilateral ceasefire in the no-fly zones, Iraq
asked the Vatican to serve as a "peacemaker" in its conflict with the
United States, and the Vatican obliged.1 3 3 Furthermore, Wissam Chawkat
al-Zahawi, Iraq's ambassador to the Holy See, recommended that the
Holy See "intervene" with the U.N. Secretary to facilitate dialogue and
to halt the military activities.1 3 4 The Vatican claimed that it was not taking
any sides in the conflict, but rather was "taking the side of reason."l35
This reasoning predicates on the Holy See's belief that "war is not always
inevitable.. . . [i]nternational law, honest dialogue, solidarity between
States, [and] the noble exercise of diplomacy ... are methods worthy of
individuals and nations in resolving their differences." 3 6 Furthermore,
the Holy See invoked international law as the source of normative force
behind its argument. Pope John Paul II explained that the U.N. Charter
and international law are reminders that war is "the last option and [must
be] in accordance with very strict conditions." 3 7 Additionally, in 2003,
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Aziz assured the Vatican of the Iraqi
government's desire for cooperation with the international community,
as well as the possibility of disarmament.1 3 8 Sources shared that Aziz also
gave the Pope a letter from Saddam Hussein, in which he denounced the
"war of aggression" and appealed to papal mediation to abate the conflict
and "spare his country."' 3
5. Papal Mediation in Iran
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami is the highest-ranking Iranian
40
The President's positive
religious leader to visit the Vatican.1
132.

Syria's Beleaguered Christians, BBC News (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/

news/world-middle-east-22270455.
133.

Victor L. Simpson, Vatican Accept Iraqi Request for U.N. Help in Ending Crisis,

ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 19, 1993), available at Factiva, Doc. No. asp0000020011031dplj008re.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136.

Peter L.P. Simpson, PopeJohn PaulH andJust War, 39 J. RELIGIOUS ETHiCS 286, 286-

87(2011).
137. Pope Warns Against War, American Catholic, CATH. NEWS SERV., http://www.
americancatholic.org/News/JustWar/Iraq/papalstate ment.asp.
138. Bruce Johnson, Aziz asks Pope to Mediatefor Peace, TELEGRAPH MEDIA GRP., LTD.

(Feb. 15, 2003), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/1
Pope- to-mediate-for-peace.html.
139. Id.
140.

4 22

192/Aziz-asks-

Europe Pope Meets Iranian Leader, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2015), http://news.bbc.co.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss2/1

18

McFarlane: The Holy See's Diplomacy: An Analysis of Papal Mediation in the M

2016]1

THE HOLY SEE'S DIPLOMACY

185

interaction with the Pope translated to deeper diplomatic relations
between the international subjects. The Holy See's involvement in Iran
was quite unique because it addressed the politically charged topic of
nuclear proliferation. The Pope declared that he hoped to reach an
agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group pertaining to the use of
nuclear energy.14 1 The Vatican's public disapproval of nuclear weaponry
started in 1963 when Pope John XXIII called for a total ban on nuclear
weapons in the encyclical Pacem in Terris.14 2 Two years later, Pope Paul
VI declared, "never again war" at the United Nations.1 4 3 Finally, in 2010
Pope Benedict XVI called for the "complete elimination" of nuclear
weapons.1 4 4
The Holy See's relationship with Iran gave people hope, including
Western governments, that the Holy See would mediate secret
negotiations between the United States and Iran.1 4 5 The Holy See and Iran
have maintained diplomatic relations for nearly 53 years.1 4 6 The Iranian
embassy to the Holy See even has a large photo of Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini framed in the entryway, along with the "centuries-old
correspondence between popes and Persian monarchs." 47 Furthermore,
Iran has diplomatic presence at the Vatican, and its representatives even
attend monthly meetings with papal advisers.1 4 8 The Holy See's
determination to mediate the tension between the United States and Iran
is partially based on Pope John Paul II's opposition to the U.S. invasion
of Iraq.1 4 9 A Vatican insider explained that the Holy See exercises "great
prudence . . . . The judgment shown on Iraq weighs on the Iran
situation." 1so
However, the Holy See has served to the benefit of both countries. For
instance, the Obama administration asked the Pope to mediate the talks
concerning the release of American prisoners in Iran, and at least one of
the prisoner's family members reached out to Pope Francis for aid as
uk/2/hi/europe/294703.stm.
141. P5+1 consists of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and
Germany. Carlo Marroni, Open DialogueBetween the Vatican and Iran, ITALY 24 (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.italy24.ilsole24ore.com/art/panorama/2015-02-03/open-dialogue-between-the-

vatican-and-iran-I 20556.php?uuid=ABGAdUoC.
142. Taylor Wofford, Vatican 'Welcomes' Obama 'sIranDeal, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 15,2015),
http://www.newsweek.com/vaticanbacksirandeal-372383.

143.
144.

Id.
Id.

145.
146.

Marroni, supra note 141.
Jess Israely, Iran's Secret Weapon: The Pope, TIME (Nov. 26, 2007), http://content.

time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1687445,00.htm].
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
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well.' 5 1 In February 2015, Shahindokht Molaverdi, Iran's Vice President

for women and family affairs, stated in the Catholic publication Crux that
Iran was receptive to papal mediation by Pope Francis, similar to his
engagement with normalizing U.S.-Cuba relations.1 52 Molaverdi believes
that the Pope has the "ability to bring people together, which can
influence governments." 5 3 At the 59th General Conference of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, Paul Gallagher, Secretary for the
Holy See's relations with States, declared, "As Pope Francis said last
December, 'The security of our own future depends on guaranteeing the
peaceful security of others . . . ."154 The Holy See supports the final
agreement reached. Archbishop Gallagher shared that "the way for the
solution of conflicts, in the Middle East . . . is that of dialogue and

negotiation and not that of confrontation." 55 The agreement purports
both dialogue and negotiation as the ideal processes to resolve
disputes. 156
C. The Holy See's Platforms ofLegitimacy in the Middle East
The cases illustrate the Holy See's cultural diplomacy as one source
of its credibility to mediate international conflicts. Professor M.C. Mirow
describes the Holy See as a "well-oiled bureaucratic machine."'5 The

Holy See's approach stems from tactfulness and prudence in handling
international affairs.s8 First, Archbishop Bernardito Auza explains that
151. Imprisoned Iranian Pastor May Motivate Vatican to Help in Talks to Release U.S
Prisonersin Iran, MOHABAT NEWS (Sept. 26, 2015), http://mohabatnews.com/en/?p=2546.
152. John P. Shimek, Iranian Presidentto Meet with Pope Francis, NATIONAL CATHOLIC
REGISTER (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.ncregister.com/blog/jpshimek/iranian-president-to-meet-

with-pope-francis
153. Id.
154. Paul R. Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States, Intervention by the Holy See at
the 59th Gen. Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/secretariat state/2015/documents/rc-seg-st-20150914_59thgeneral-conference-iaeaen.htmi

155. Id.
156. Jordan Schachtel, Vatican Welcomes Iran Deal, PressuresIsrael to Give up Nukes,
2
BREITBART (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/ 015/09/15/vatican-

welcomes-iran-deal-pressures-israel-give-nukes/.
157. Mirow, supra note 72, at 26.
158. See, e.g., McEachern, supra note 8, at 79 (citing John Paul 11, "World Day of Peace
Message: Respect for Human Rights: The Secret of Peace" 472).

The freedom of the individual in seeking the truth and in the corresponding
profession of his or her religious convictions must be specifically guaranteed
within the juridical structure of society; that is, it must be recognized and

confirmed by civil law as a personal and inalienable right in order to be
safeguarded from any kind of coercion by individuals, social groups or any

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss2/1

20

McFarlane: The Holy See's Diplomacy: An Analysis of Papal Mediation in the M

2016}

THE HOLY SEE'S DIPLOMACY

187

the Holy See relies on informal channels to "develop the confidence and
respect that support its role as a mediator."1 59 These informal channels
consider the multiplicity of engagements between the Holy See and the
disputing parties. Such informal channels range from speeches-such as
the speech given to the Moroccan youth-to informal letters sent to
governments concerning the Pope's discontent with their actions because
of the potential interferences with international obligations. Both types of
informal channels rely on international law, typically human rights law
or humanitarian law, to foster solidarity between different groups.
Accordingly, the Holy See adopted the language of international law and
voiced when actions digressed from these principles in order to actively
participate on this global platform with the approval of States and other
subjects with international legal personality.
Additionally, Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Angelo Sodano
described the Holy See's platform as "an endeavor of mediation ...
provided by international law."1 60 He further explains that the Holy See's
mediation does not always reflect a technical understanding of the
process. Rather, it is a type known as "good offices .

.

. [which] is a

concrete action of mediation, designed to encourage the parties to
talk."161 For instance, facilitating points of contact between the
Secretaries of State of the United States and Cuba and encouraging the
forty-five minute conversation between Presidents Obama and Castro
were necessary hurdles to overcome before reaching an agreement.
However, the Holy See's decision to adopt a new paradigm of
understanding with respect to the relationship between the West and the
East solidified its credibility in the eyes of the Muslim leaders.
First, the Holy See's concern that the Middle East would group the
Catholic Church with the West and presume that both entities' positions
on issues were analogous shaped the Holy See's platform of preventing
U.S. hegemony.1 62 Pope Paul VI proclaimed that through the Church's
policy of non-alignment, the Holy See forfeited its "de facto alliance with
the West" to view international affairs with a less politically-infused
platform.' 63 Accordingly, disassociating itself from the West positioned
the Holy See more favorably in non-Catholic nations. Pope John Paul II's
public disavowal of the U.S. wars against Iraq and the Holy See's attempt
human power.

Id.
159.

Id.

160. Yonif, Holy See Willing to Mediatefor Iraqi City, FREE REPUBLIC (Aug. 16, 2004),
http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/ 193002/posts.

161.

Id.

162.

Silvio Ferrari, The Middle East Policy of the Holy See, 39 THE INT'L SPECTATOR 79,

87 (2004).
163.

Formicola, supra note 77, at 806.
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to mediate, though unsuccessfully, the Iranian hostage crisis between
165
1979 and 198 1,164 lend the Holy See credibility in the Middle East. In
other words, such acts demonstrate that the Holy See is not naive to the
delicacy of relations with the Middle East. Additionally, the Holy See's
concerns with Western hegemony were publicly displayed in the Pope's
remarks about the U.N. treatment of clashing norms. Pope Francis
warned the United Nations to be conscious of cultural imperialist
16 6
The
tendencies that do not "respect the autonomy of poorer countries."
for
desire
U.N.
the
critiqued
has
who
individual
Pope is not the only
U.N.
the
that
universal norms. Scholars such as David Kennedy explain
aspiration for universal principles is misguided, since political actors
convene at the United Nations with diverse perspectives that are not
likely to be reconciled into one vision. 16 7
The Holy See similarly recognizes that nations' histories and cultures
shape the guiding interpretations of international principles, such as
human rights. For instance, the Muslim nations have rejected the concept
of human rights based on a belief that it is a "[w]estern secular concept
of Judeo-Christian origin."l 68 In 1981, the Representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran objected to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
at the General Assembly and proclaimed that the Declaration was
irreconcilable with the Islamic shari'a.169 This obstinacy to certain
Western ideals did not impede the Holy See's growing relationship with
the Middle East. Even though the Holy See already adopted the language
of this Western secular concept,1 7 0 Pope John Paul II still successfully
established five points of communication with Muslim entities that
164.

Evans, supra note 88, at 172.

165.

Id.

166. Francis X. Rocca & Farnaz Fassihi, Pope FrancisCalls on United Nations to Work for
Peace, Justice, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pope-francis-to-speakat-united-nations-1443184054.
167. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Leader, Clerk or Policy Entrepreneur? The Secretary
General in a Complex World, in SECRETARY OR GENERAL? THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY GENERAL IN WORLD POLITICS 158, 158-81 (Simon Chesterman ed., 2006) (The United
Nations is not the institutional embodiment of the international community and political elites do
not share a "consensus" view of global political or ethical matters and thus challenge is to build
bridges or cooperation and respect among the world's quite different ethical worlds).
168. McEachern, supra note 8, at 76 n.212; see David F. Littman, Universal Human Rights
and "Human Rights in Islam," (1999), reprinted in THE MYTH OF ISLAMIC TOLERANCE: HOW
ISLAMIC LAW TREATS NON-MUSLIMS, 317, 322-24 (Robert Spencer ed., 2005).
169. McEachern, supra note 8, at 76 n.212; See Littman, Universal Human Rights and
"Human Rights in Islam," supra note 168, at 322.
170. See, e.g., McEachem, supra note 8, at 79-80 (John Paul H declared in "Serving the
Cause of Human Rights" that "[aill spring from the inherent nature of humankind; these elements,
which are essential to the existence of each person, are not subject to any 'concession' on the part
of the state, which must restrict itself to 'recognizing' these realities which exist over and above
the law and the jurisdiction of those whose job it is to enforce it.").
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pertained to these very principles.1 7 ' The dialogues led to the creation of
a Muslim-Catholic Liaison Committee that provided a platform for
representatives from both the Vatican and Muslim organizations to
engage in conversation about the Holy Land.1 7 2 For instance, in 2002 the
Committee called for "an immediate cease-fire, and the withdrawal of the
war machine" in the Middle East.1 73 The incorporation of various human
rights including "the right of civilians in a war situation [in which]
nobody should be prevented from access to water, food, medical care,
and all the necessities of life," 1 74 demonstrates the success of the
dialogues. Thus, the organizations now affirm the very principles they
initially refuted merely twenty years prior. Additionally, Pope John Paul
II's pontificate concluded four agreements with three Islamic States:
Kazakhstan, Morocco, and Egypt.1 75 Furthermore, agreements were also
concluded with non-state entities, including the Palestine Liberation
Organization.1 7 6 Even though these agreements dealt with religious
freedom, the entities' willingness to even consider legal relations with a
subject of Western origin with only legal personality illustrates the
success of the Holy See's decision to disassociate itself from Western
hegemony.
Third, the Holy See abandoned the Western paradigm to construe
171. See McEachern,supra note 8, at 78 (citing JOHN L. ALLEN, THE FUTURE CHURCH: How
TEN TRENDS ARE REVOLUTIONIZING THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 118 (2009)). The five standing

interfaith dialogues include:
(1)

The

Muslim-Catholic

Liaison

Committee

which

brings together

representatives from the Vatican and various Muslim organizations such as the
World Muslim Congress, the World Muslim League, the International Islamic
Committee for Da'wah and Humanitarian Relief, the International Forum for

Dialogue, and the Islamic Economic and Social and Cultural Organization of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference; (2) The Pontifical Council for
Interreligious Dialogue and the Permanent Committee of al-Alzhar for Dialogue
with the Monotheistic Religions established a Joint Committee for Dialogue in

1998; (3) The Coordinating Committee with the World Islamic Call Society,
based in Libya includes six Muslims and six Catholics who meet annually; (4) A
biannual colloquium with the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization of the
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in Iran; (5) A standing dialogue with

the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Turkey.
Id.

172.

Id.

173. Declarationfrom the Islamic-CatholicLiaison Committee on the Current Situation in
the Holy Land, http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/pontifical councils/interelg/documents/

rcpc intereg_doc 20020415islamic-catholic-liaisonen.html
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conflicts as "clash[es] of civilizations" 177 and instead adopted a cultural
relativist perspective. Pope John Paul II, for example, advised former
President George W. Bush and former Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom Tony Blair to not go to war with Iraq, since it would be
portrayed as a 'clash of civilizations' between Muslims and
Christians."l 78 It is apparent that the Holy See's cultural relativist
approach coincided with its new platform of taking the side of reason.
The Holy See recognizes the inadequacy of mediation in certain conflicts,
as well as the changing terrains that manifest challenges, both of which
require alternate stances on issues. For instance, the Holy See's initial
animosity toward the U.S.-Iraq war changed when the Pope no longer
believed that mediation through dialogue or even economic sanctions
could abate the tension with Daesh.1 79 The Pope's new support of U.S.
airstrikes in Iraq to prevent "unjust aggression"1 80 portrayed a shift in
thinking. This shift represents his support of humanitarian intervention
that requires force so long as it aligns with international law-specifically
the just war doctrine and the responsibility to protect principle.1 8
Fourth, the Holy See rarely changes its position on a particular issue.
The aforementioned situation is unique in that the Holy See appealed to
international law as the justification for its new stance. However, the
Holy See has maintained its stern position on nuclear proliferation. It has
publicly proclaimed its opposition to nuclear weaponry since the early
1960s and has maintained this position throughout the entire negotiations,
proving that political opposition does not easily sway the Holy See.
Archbishop Gallagher's decision to single out Israel by declaring that the
country needs to establish nuclear free zones in the Middle East182 affirms
the stability of the Holy See's platform, and that it is not easily disrupted
by the political dynamics of the international system. Furthermore, this
characteristic can have legal implications to the benefit of the Holy See.
Unilateral declarations may create legal obligations on the parties to
which such statements are directed. 183 The obligations will arise only if
the declaration is made publicly with the intent to be bound, and an oral
or written acceptance, or a simple reply or reaction from the parties, is
177.

Ferrari, supra note 162, at 87.
178. Agence France-Presse, Iraq: Vatican Ready to Mediate in NajafStandoff RELIEFWEB
(Aug. 17, 2004), http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-vatican-ready-mediate-najaf-standoff.
179. Joan Frawley Desmond, Has Pope FrancisEndorsed US. Airstrikes in Iraq?, NAT'L
CATH. REG. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/has-pope-francis-endorsedu.s.-airstrikes-in-iraq.

180. Id.
181. Josephine McKenna & David Gibson, On Iraq, Pope Francis'Message ofPeace Meets
Reality of War, NAT'L CATH. REP. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://ncronline.org/news/peace-justice/iraqpope-francis-message-peace-meets-reality-war.
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not necessary to confirm this obligation.1 8 4 The Holy See has mastered
the use of unilateral acts to impose legal duties on States. The Pope's
public disavowal of certain State activities based on humanitarian and
human rights concerns has led States to actively uphold the standards of
these two doctrines. States' decisions to abide by these standards, such as
Castro's release of prisoners subjected to human rights violations after
the Pope's condemning remarks, lend credence to the force of the Holy
See's declarations.
Fifth, the Holy See's mastery of "soft power" legitimizes its
engagement in mediation outside of the Catholic World. Joseph S. Nye
explains that "soft power" influences countries to want what the exerciser
wants.18 1 While soft power is non-binding, it may still be more influential
than binding acts. The Holy See functions under a platform of
international law. The institution justifies its actions and preferences not
under spiritual invocations, but rather with its adherence to human rights
and humanitarian law. One could find connections between human rights
standards and the Pope's spiritual tenets. However, the Pope did not
always proclaim these inherent rights and actively participate in the
defense of all people's protected rights, irrespective of religion. Pope
John Paul II was the first pope to enter a mosque and the first to visit a
Jewish synagogue in modem times. 1 8 6 Furthermore, it was only 15 years
ago when a Pope actually called for peace and reconciliation between
Christian, Muslims, and Jews, even seeking forgiveness for Christians'
anti-Semitic behavior throughout history.18 7 The Holy See's "soft power"
derives from its utilization of the very standards of legitimacy States
apply to evaluate their own and other States' actions. The Holy See
opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq under the just war doctrine and
denounced nuclear proliferation under humanitarian concerns. Hence, the
institution's "soft power" is supplementary to its inherent spirituality.
Additionally, the Pope has announced numerous times that he will offer
the Holy See's mediation services under the condition that both parties
accept his facilitation and the use of the Holy See's clergy and resources.
Part of the Holy See's "soft power" derives from the Pope's partial
control over the type of leverage the Holy See will have over the parties.
As long as the Pope receives an invitation with the support of both
disputants, the Holy See assures some leverage over the invitees. Thus,
the Holy See guarantees its "soft power" over the disputing States, since
the appeal to papal mediation has basis in the States' desire for the Holy
See's intervention and in the States' acceptance of the institution's
platforms of legitimacy and use of international standards.
184.

Id.

185.
186.

Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL'Y 153, 166 (1990).
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The cases illustrate that spiritual force is an oversimplified analysis of
the Holy See's legitimacy to mediate international conflicts. The findings
underscore Reverend Patrick J. Corish's claim that "there is a link
between diplomacy and strength. If diplomacy is the alternative to force,
88
some kind of force remains the backing of effective diplomacy."' The
Holy See's engagement with non-Catholic nations is sheer diplomacy.
The Pope's view of regions as differently situated areas with unique
tensions endemic to particular boundaries has resulted in the Holy See's
conscious effort to disentangle itself from the West.1 89 Additionally,
notions of dignity and social justice are principles that the entire
90
international system adopted through the human rights movement.1 It is
thus too simplistic to argue that faith-based actors' current plea for
humanitarianism, for instance, is simply due to spirituality rather than an
appeal to the very language States use to describe their own duties and
obligations. The stronger the Holy See's diplomatic presence outside of
the Catholic Church's realm, the more willing non-Catholic nations will
be to abdicate historical notions of legitimacy and to change the pattern
of international mediation.
For future research, it is important to evaluate when the Holy See
actually adopted the human rights vernacular. Scholar Wolfgang
Friedmann explains that international law now transitions at three
different levels.19' The first level deals with the coexistence of states; the
second level addresses the universality of international law, such as
human rights concerns; and the third level is the adoption of international
92
principles into the domestic legal structure and community laws.1
Accordingly, international law adopted the human rights paradigm at a
specific moment in time. Thus, the era in which the Holy See also adopted
this vernacular may complicate the notion that its legitimacy derives from
its spirituality and the invocation of morality and justice. If the date the
Holy See began to use human rights principles coincides with the
international system's adoption of the paradigm, then the Holy See may
simply be responding to a shift in the international system in which
legitimacy now derives from States' abilities to uphold these principles.
188. Patrick J. Corish, The Holy See and the Second World War, 55 AN IRISH Q. REv. 82,
83 (1966).
189. See Ferrari,supra note 162, at 87.
190.
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HUMANITARIANISM 1 (2005) (explaining that human rights "raised the standards by which
governments judge one another, and by which they are judged, both by their own people, and by
the elites we refer to collectively as the 'international community"'). Accordingly, ideas of
legitimacy now derive from the human rights vocabulary.
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Additionally, Professor Alejandro Alvarez explains that principles of
morality and equality are less rigid standards that are more adaptable to
solving political problems.1 93 His understanding underscores the role of
politics in the international system, which cannot be ignored even when
examining non-state actors like the Holy See. The Holy See is a wellrespected diplomatic actor, and thus part of its diplomacy is its appeal to
the politics of the system. Accordingly, it is critical to proceed with
caution when evaluating papal mediation in international conflict.
Morality and equality may espouse hints of spirituality, but the impetus
behind this platform may stem from pure politics. Mediation at the
international level attempts to reconcile a system dominated by more than
one contradictory principle. These contradictions influence the political
instability and problems that require processes like mediation to confront
the tensions
Hence, we cannot be too quick to diagnose certain faith-based actors'
proclamations for morality and equality as derivatives of spirituality
rather than political objectives. Creating a timeline that positions the Holy
See's adoption of this platform alongside the international system's
adoption of the human rights paradigm will shed light on whether the
Holy See's mediation strategy is a response to its spiritual mission or its
diplomacy.
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